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Abstract 
This paper investigates the allocation decision of an investor with two projects. Separate managers 
control the mean return from each project, and the investor may or may not observe the 
managers’ actions. We show that the investor’s risk-return trade-off may be radically different 
from a standard portfolio choice setting, even if managers’ actions are observable and enforceable. 
In particular, feedback effects working through optimal contracts and effort levels imply that 
expected terminal wealth is nonlinear in initial wealth allocation. The optimal portfolio may 
involve very little diversification, despite projects that are highly symmetric in the underlying 
model. We also show that moral hazard in one of the projects need not imply lower allocation to 
that project. Expected returns are generally lower than under the first-best, but the optimal 
contract shifts more of the idiosyncratic risk in the hidden action project to the manager in charge 
of it. The minimum-variance position of the investor’s (net) terminal wealth would in most cases 
involve a portfolio shift towards the hidden action project, and there are plausible cases where this 
would dominate the overall effect on the second-best optimal portfolio when comparing with the 
first-best. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Investors commonly delegate the management of their resources to several professional 
managers. Examples include mutual fund investors that spread their holdings between 
different fund managers, venture capitalists that allocate capital to many entrepreneurs, 
and direct investments in firms governed by different CEOs. The allocation decision 
faced by an investor in such cases can be described as a portfolio choice where the return 
on available assets is, in part, determined by the actions of different agents. Indeed, one 
may argue that the purpose of delegated investment management is to realize a rate of 
return that managers, but not the investor, can possibly achieve. As a large literature on 
optimal contracts makes clear,1 the actions of managers under such investment 
arrangements are influenced by the compensation schemes offered to them. In a delegated 
investment setting, a rational investor must thus choose the optimal managerial 
contracts, in addition to the optimal portfolios. 
Despite the frequent occurrence of delegated investment arrangements, standard 
models of portfolio choice usually assume that investors manage their own wealth,2 
making them unsuitable for analyzing the type of investment decisions discussed here. 
Models of optimal contracts have been applied to portfolio choice (Sung, 1995; Dybvig et 
al., 2001; Ou-Yang, 2003; Westerfield, 2005), but these applications analyze how the 
portfolio choice of agents (i.e., managers) responds to contractual incentives; they do not 
discuss how an investor’s portfolio selection interacts with optimal contracts.3 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), Schättler and Sung (1993, 1997), Sung (1995, 2005), Müller 
(1998), Ou-Yang (2003), and Westerfield (2005). 
2 See Campbell and Viceira (2002) for a synthesis of modern theories of portfolio choice. 
3 The contract literature referred to here discusses models with one principal and one agent, which obviously 
precludes an analysis of how an investor optimally should allocate wealth among several managers. 
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This paper investigates the portfolio decisions of an investor that can allocate her 
wealth between two projects. The mean rate of return from each project is determined by 
the actions (effort) of the manager in charge of it. These actions may or may not be 
observed by the investor, and are affected by the contract between investor and the 
managers. The model draws on the analysis of dynamic principal–agent problems by 
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), Schättler and Sung (1993, 1997), Sung (1995), and 
Müller (1998). That is, we explore a continuous-time model where output follows a 
Brownian motion and both the principal (the investor) and the agents (the managers) 
have constant absolute risk aversion, defined over terminal wealth4. This is a natural 
point of departure as, unlike the static principal–agent problem, the continuous-time 
version admits relatively easily interpreted solutions. 
Upon presenting the model in Section 2, we analyze the first-best case of 
observable and enforceable actions in Section 3. We show that, even in this case, the risk-
return trade-off involved in the investor’s portfolio decision is quite different from that in 
a standard portfolio choice model. First, the investor’s risk aversion is effectively lower 
than her CARA-coefficient, because some of the terminal wealth risk is carried by the 
managers, according to the optimal contracts. Second, there are important feedback 
effects, working through optimal contracts and efforts, that make expected terminal 
wealth nonlinear in initial wealth allocation. Depending on the shape of managers’ cost 
functions, the investor may have incentives to choose a highly “nondiversified” portfolio, 
even if the projects are completely symmetric. A general insight is that, in a principal–
agent setting, the rate of return on a given investment is endogenous to the level of 
                                                 
4 Williams (2004) and Sannikov (2004) study moral hazard models where the (single) agent can consume 
continuously. Williams’s model is very general, but in most cases the solution can only be characterized and 
not solved explicitly. Sannikov assumes a risk neutral principal, making that model less suitable for studying 
an investor’s portfolio choice. 
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investment in that project; standard portfolio choice models treat the rate of return (and 
risk) on available assets as exogenous. 
In Section 4, we investigate the case where there are hidden actions in one of the 
projects.5 This introduces an asymmetry where, a priori, one perhaps would expect a tilt 
in the portfolio away from the hidden action project. We do indeed show that the 
expected return in this project is generally lower than in the first-best. However, the 
relevant risk in the project, as seen from the investor’s point of view, may be lower with 
moral hazard. This is because the investor uses the output from the project where actions 
can be observed as a signal to be included in the contract with the other manager 
(Holmstrom, 1982). The optimal contract then implies that the manager with hidden 
actions must carry more of the idiosyncratic risk associated with his project. 
Consequently, the minimum-variance allocation of the investor’s wealth is in most cases 
tilted towards the hidden action project. Even if expected returns generally would be 
lower in this project, there are therefore plausible cases where the investor would in fact 
invest more in it than if she had full information. 
Section 5 concludes the paper, and proofs are in the appendix. 
 
2. The principal–agent framework 
 
                                                 
5 Think of a fund that employs some managers “in-house”, with the possibility of internal monitoring, and 
delegates some of its assets to external managers, where the possibilities of monitoring are limited. Another 
example can be taken from the literature on the “home-bias puzzle” (see Lewis, 1999, for a survey), where it 
is sometimes argued that investors hold the lion’s share of their portfolios domestically because there is 
asymmetric information across countries. A possible interpretation of the setup in Section 4 is that of an 
investor who can make direct investments in imperfectly correlated domestic and foreign projects, and where 
it is easier to monitor the actions of a domestic manager. 
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We investigate the principal–agent relationship on the time interval [0,1]. At time 0, the 
principal (the investor) decides how to allocate initial wealth W(0) = W0 between two 
projects, A and B. The investment decision is assumed to be irreversible; the allocation is 
fixed until time 1.6 The output from the projects is publicly observable and governed by 
the processes 
 ( )0 0( ) ( ), , ( ), ,i i i i i idX t f u t X t dt X dz t i A B= + σ = , (1) 
where Xi0 is the amount invested project i, XA0 + XB0 = W0. Furthermore, σi is a diffusion 
parameter and dzi is a standard Wiener process that represents a project-specific shock. 
The instantaneous correlation coefficient ρ of these shocks is obtained from dzAdzB = ρdt, 
ρ ∈ [–1,1). Throughout, we will assume that the production function f is given by 
 0 0( , , ) ( ) , ,i i i if u X t u t X i A B= = . (2) 
The variable ui (later referred to as “effort”) is controlled by the manager in charge of 
project i (manager i), and may or may not be observed by the investor. In any case, the 
expected rate of return on invested resources in project i is controlled by manager i. 
This setup implies that the investor accumulates wealth according to 
 ( ) 0 0( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ' ( )A B BdW t u t u t u t W dt W d t⎡ ⎤= ω − + + Σ⎣ ⎦ w B , (3) 
where 
 
2
0
1
A
B B
σ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥Σ = ⎢ ⎥σ ρ σ − ρ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
, 
ω is the fraction of initial wealth invested in project A, ' [ 1 ], [ ]'Ad dz dh≡ ω −ω ≡w B , 
and dh is a standard Wiener process with the property that it is independent of dzA. 
                                                 
6 This assumption is imposed to obtain tractability, as allowing for continuous reallocation would introduce 
time-dependent drifts in the processes for XA and XB. Schättler and Sung (1997) show that introducing time-
dependent drifts of the Brownian motions would destroy the result that sharing rules are linear in output, 
and therefore the tractability of the model. 
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At time 0, the investor and the managers individually agree on sharing rules 
specifying payment from the investor to the managers at time 1. The sharing rules 
specify salaries SA and SB for manager A and B, respectively, and these are stochastic via 
dependence on the outcome of the stochastic process for W. The managers’ control 
variables, uA ≥ 0 and uB ≥ 0, can be revised continuously during the time interval [0,1] 
and may depend on the history of W in [0,t], but not on the future (t,1]. 
The managers incur costs of effort, assumed, for simplicity, to be quadratic in the 
level of effort 
 ( ) 2120 0( ), , ( ) , ,i i i ic u t X t u t X i A Bθ= = , 
where θ ≥ 0. The assumptions of linear output and convex costs in effort are sufficient 
for well-defined solutions to both the first- and the second-best problems discussed below; 
see Theorem 4.2 in Schättler and Sung (1993). Observe that cost functions are 
symmetric: for a given allocation of resources, the cost of effort is equal for the two 
managers; for given effort, the cost of managing wealth is equal. 
Finally, both the investor and the managers have exponential utility functions. 
The investor’s constant coefficient of absolute risk aversion is R while the two managers 
are equally risk averse with a CARA-coefficient r. 
 
3. Full information 
 
We shall first characterize the optimal sharing rules, effort levels, and resource allocation 
in the first-best setting; that is, when both managers’ controls are observable and can be 
enforced at no cost. This analysis demonstrates that the trade-offs involved in the 
diversification decision are quite different from a standard portfolio choice model, even 
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when the investor can observe the actions of the managers. In addition, the analysis 
provides a benchmark for the case of asymmetric information considered below. 
 
3.1. General solution 
Ignoring time discounting, the investor’s first-best problem at time 0 is 
 ( ){ }
{ , }, , ,
max exp (1)
A B A B
A Bu u S S
E R W S S
ω
⎡ ⎤− − − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ , (4) 
subject to (4) and to the managers’ participation constraints: 
 ( ) { }1 0 00exp ( , , ) exp , ,i i iE r S c u X t dt rU i A B⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤⎪ ⎪− − − ≥− − =⎢ ⎥⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭∫ , (5) 
where U0 is the managers’ certainty equivalent at time 0, assumed to be identical for the 
two managers. The solution to this problem is summarized in the first result. 
 
Proposition 1: Under full information, the effort levels are constant, unique, and 
determined by the equality between the marginal productivity and the marginal cost of 
effort: 
 10 , ,i iu X i A B
−θ= = . (6) 
Moreover, the salaries of the two managers are linear in combined output: 
 (1)
2i i
RS K W
r R
= +
+
, (7) 
where 
 ( )2 2 21 12 20 0 0 01 ln , , ;2i i i i i j j
rK RW ru X R u X u X i A B i j
r R R
θ θ θ⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞λ ⎟⎜⎢ ⎥≡ − + + − = ≠⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥+ ⎣ ⎦
, 
is a constant. Finally, the investor allocates a fraction 
 
( )2 1 2 1 212 0 0
2 2 2 2 2 2
0 0
2 2
( 2 ) ( 2 ) 2
B B A AA B B AB
A B AB A B AB A B AB
u X u Xu u r R r R
W R r W R r
θ− θ−⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ θ −− σ −σ+ +⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ω = + +⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥σ + σ − σ σ + σ − σ σ + σ − σ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 (8) 
of initial wealth to project A. 
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Proof: See the appendix. 
 
The effort levels uA and uB are constant because ω is constant and W0 is given. 
We note from (6) that the first-best effort levels generally depend on the investor’s 
allocation decision. Managers’ effort is increasing (decreasing) with resources under 
management if θ is smaller (greater) than one. This is because the managers’ marginal 
productivity of effort increases faster (more slowly) in allocated resources than do 
marginal costs when θ < (>) 1, giving incentives to increase (decrease) effort. Note also 
that, given the optimal effort levels, the production functions in (2) are increasing in Xi0 
if θ < 2, and have increasing returns in Xi0 if θ < 1. 
The optimal sharing rules given in (7) are similar to the corresponding rule in the 
one-agent model of Müller (1998). One difference is that the coefficient before W(1) gives 
more weight to the principal’s risk aversion, as she now shares the final output with two 
agents. Moreover, the first-best sharing rules imply full risk sharing between the two 
managers. They receive a fixed share of total output, independent of the relative output 
from the project of which they are in charge. The constant amounts paid to the two 
managers differ to the extent that their effort costs differ. The agent with the highest 
effort cost receives the biggest constant amount. 
The demand function (8) describes the investor’s optimal diversification with full 
information. The first term on the right-hand side represents demand arising from 
potentially higher return on one of the projects. Relative to a standard portfolio selection 
problem (see Ch. 2 in Campbell and Viceira, 2002, for a recent exposition), this demand 
is adjusted by a factor (r + 2R)/r: the inverse of the share of final wealth retained by the 
investor according to the optimal contracts. Any given expected return difference has a 
 9
bigger impact on the allocation decision, the higher the share of final wealth retained by 
the investor. The second term is new, compared to standard portfolio choice problems. It 
reflects possible differences in managers’ marginal wealth management costs. If, for a 
given allocation, manager A’s marginal cost is higher than B’s, it will contribute to 
lowering the allocation to project A. This is due to the properties of the constant 
amounts specified in the optimal contracts, as discussed above. The last term in (8) is the 
portfolio share that minimizes the variance of time 1 wealth. If marginal expected returns 
and marginal costs are equal across projects, the minimum-variance portfolio is optimal. 
 
3.2. A mean-variance interpretation 
Proposition 1 does not give a closed-form solution to the first-best problem; this is 
possible for a few values of θ only (to be discussed below). The proposition does however 
characterize the trade-offs involved in the investor’s allocation decision.  
To see how, we first recall that the investor derives utility from net final wealth. 
We can use Proposition 1 to write net final wealth as 
 ( )2 212 0 0(1) (1)2A B A A B B
rW S S W u X u X
r R
θ θ⎡ ⎤− − = − +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦+ . (9) 
Next, observe that constant first-best effort levels imply that the wealth process (3) 
follows an arithmetic Brownian motion. It follows that the gross return on wealth over 
the time interval [0,1] is normal with mean 1 + ωuA + (1-ω)uB and standard deviation 
w’Σ. With normally distributed returns, maximizing (4) is equivalent to maximizing the 
mean-variance utility function 
 [ ] [ ]12(1) var (1)A B A BE W S S R W S S− − − − − . 
Taking the expectation in (9) and using (6), we have 
 [ ] ( )221 12 20 0 0(1) ( ) (1 )2A B
rE W S S W W W
r R
−θ−θ⎡ ⎤− − = + ω + −ω⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦+ , (10) 
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while the variance is 
 [ ]
2
2
0var (1) ' '2A B
rW S S W
r R
⎛ ⎞⎟⎜− − = ΣΣ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠+ w w . (11) 
We can thus write the investor’s mean-variance utility as 
 2 2 21 1 12 2 20 0 0 0( ) ((1 ) ) ' '2
rRW W W W
r R
−θ −θ⎡ ⎤+ ω + −ω − ΣΣ⎣ ⎦ + w w . (12) 
This is an indirect utility function, characterizing the investor’s risk-return trade-off after 
incorporating the first-best effort levels and contracts. 
The mean-variance function in (12) highlights two differences from a standard 
portfolio choice model. First, the effective risk aversion is rR/(r+2R) < R. Some of the 
final wealth risk is carried by the managers, implying less aversion to a given wealth 
variance of the investor. The investor’s risk tolerance, or risk-bearing capacity, is (r + 
2R)/rR, compared to 1/R in the standard model. The difference in risk tolerance between 
the two models is thus 2/r; the less risk averse the managers, the higher is the investor’s 
tolerance of final wealth variance compared to the standard model. 
Second, expected net final wealth is generally a nonlinear function of initial 
wealth allocation (it is linear in the standard model). This nonlinearity occurs because of 
feedback effects from wealth allocation to expected net final wealth; allocation of wealth 
determines effort and salaries, which in turn determines expected net final wealth. 
Let the function F(ω) denote expected net final wealth, as given in the square 
brackets of (12), defined over the interval ω ∈ [0,1].7 The properties of F(ω) depend on 
the size of θ, as does accordingly the investor’s portfolio choice. 
Suppose first that θ ∈ [0,1). We can then establish that F(ω) is strictly convex in 
ω ∈ [0,1] and that it is symmetric around ω = ½. This implies that expected net final 
                                                 
7 From (6), short positions in any of the projects would violate the assumptions of nonnegative effort levels. 
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wealth is maximized by investing all initial wealth in either A or B. Underlying this 
property is that, by (6), effort levels are increasing in Xi0 and, by (2), there are increasing 
returns in the projects. The consequence for portfolio choice depends on the relative size 
of σA and σB. If σA < σB, the minimum-variance position requires more than 50% of initial 
wealth in project A. In addition, however, there is now a net expected portfolio return to 
be gained by investing even more in A. The investor is generally willing to trade some 
final wealth variance against this increase in expected returns and the optimal portfolio is 
thus in the interval between the minimum-variance portfolio and ω = 1. Analogously, σA 
> σB implies that the optimal portfolio share ω is in the interval between 0 and the 
minimum-variance position. In summary, when θ ∈ [0,1) the endogenous responses of 
effort levels imply that the optimal portfolio is tilted beyond the composition that 
minimizes final wealth variance.8 
The next case is θ = 1. Equation (6) now implies that effort levels are 
independent of wealth allocation, implying constant expected returns in the two projects. 
This corresponds to a standard portfolio choice model. Moreover, as uA = uB = 1, 
expected returns are equal in A and B, implying that the minimum-variance portfolio is 
optimal. 
Now turn to the case where θ ∈ (1,2). We can show that F(ω) is symmetric 
around ω = ½ in this case as well, but it is now strictly concave over ω ∈ [0,1]. Expected 
net final wealth is therefore maximized by investing equal amounts in A and B. This is 
because effort levels are decreasing in Xi0, giving decreasing returns of the production 
functions in (2). Hence, any reallocation towards, for example, A from ω = ½ gives a 
                                                 
8 If σA = σB and θ ∈ [0,1), the model gives ambiguous predictions as to whether the portfolio would be tilted 
towards A or B. 
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smaller gain in terms of increased expected output from A than the loss of expected 
output from B. The optimal portfolio is between ω = ½ and the minimum-variance 
portfolio, with the tilt being towards A (B) if σA < (>) σB. The minimum-variance 
portfolio is the optimal portfolio if σA = σB. 
With θ = 2, F(ω) is a constant. Expected net final wealth is thus independent of 
the allocation decision, and the optimal portfolio is the minimum-variance portfolio. 
Finally, consider the case where θ > 2. Equations (2) and (6) now imply that 
output from both projects falls with invested resources, making this case perhaps less 
interesting. Anyway, we can show that expected net final wealth is again maximized by 
investing all resources in one project only. The optimal portfolio is accordingly located in 
the same intervals as in the case with θ ∈ [0,1). 
 
3.3. Closed form solutions in three special cases 
If managers’ costs are either independent of wealth (θ = 0), linear in wealth (θ = 
1), or quadratic in wealth (θ = 2), we can solve the investor’s portfolio in closed form. 
The latter two cases were discussed above; they both imply that the minimum-variance 
portfolio is optimal. 
With θ = 0, we can use (8) to show that the optimal share of initial wealth 
invested in project A is 
 
2
2 2
( ) ( 2 )
( 2 ) 2( 2 )
B AB
A B AB
rR r R
rR r R
σ −σ − +ω = σ + σ − σ − + . (13) 
When σA = σB, the optimal and minimum-variance portfolios coincide at ω = ½. If σA ≠ 
σB, the optimal portfolio is tilted beyond what is implied by the minimum-variance 
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portfolio. The intuition was explained in the last subsection: as θ < 1, the investor can 
increase expected returns by investing in one project only. 
 
4. Diversification with asymmetric information 
 
We now turn to the case where the investor cannot observe the actions of manager B. 
The investor faces asymmetric information along two dimensions: she knows less about 
the actions of manager B than does the manager himself, and she knows more about the 
actions of manager A than of B’s. We are primarily interested in the consequences of 
these asymmetries for diversification and portfolio choice. In particular, does less 
information necessarily mean less investment? 
 
4.1. The second-best problem 
With moral hazard in project B, the investor faces an additional constraint: 
 ( ){ }1 00arg max exp ( , , )
B
B B B B
u
u E r S c u X t dt
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥∈ − − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫ . 
This is the familiar incentive compatibility constraint, which says that manager B 
chooses the uB that is in his best interest. We follow Schättler and Sung (1993), and use 
the so-called first-order approach to solve the investor’s problem. In this approach, the 
incentive compatibility constraint in the principal’s problem is relaxed to the first-order 
necessary condition for optimality in the agent’s problem. 
As the investor has full information on the actions of manager A, and as the 
managers do not control variances of the Brownian processes, the output from project A 
serves as a signal to be included in the contract between the investor and manager B. In 
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particular, following Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987, pp. 324–25), we assume that the 
salary to manager B is conditioned on the aggregate performance index 
 
( )
( )
0
0
cov ( ), ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
var ( )
( ) ( ).
A B
B A
A
B B
B A
A A
X t X t
Y t X t X t
X t
XX t X t
X
= −
ρσ= − σ
 
Using (1), (2), and (3), we can show that this index evolves according to: 
 [ ]0 0( ) ( ) ( ) ' ( )BAB B A BdY t X u t u t dt X d tρσσ= − + Σm B , (14) 
where ' [ 1]B
A
ρσ
σ≡ −m . 
Now, the problem of manager B is 
 ( ){ }1 00max exp ( , , )B B B Bu E r S c u X t dt⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥− − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫ , 
subject to (14), taking as given the actions of manager A and the allocation decision of 
the investor. Applying the representation given in Schättler and Sung (1993), we can 
show that the solution to this problem gives the optimal sharing rule: 
 
1 1 1
2 21 1
2 20 0 0 0
0 0 0
' ( ) ( ) ' 'B B B B B B BS U u X dt u X d t r u X dt
θ θ θ= + + Σ + ΣΣ∫ ∫ ∫m B m m . (15) 
The first two terms on the right-hand side of (15) provide manager B with his certainty 
equivalent plus compensation for the cost he actually incurs. The next term is the 
compensation error, arising because the investor’s compensation is based on realized 
outcome rather than the manager’s actual effort. Finally, to compensate manager B for 
the risk he carries, a risk-premium is paid, given by the last term in (15). 
The investor’s relaxed problem can then be written as 
 ( ){ }
, , ,
max exp (1)
A B A
A Bu u S
E R W S S
ω
⎡ ⎤− − − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ,  
subject to (3), (15), and manager A’s participation constraint. The solution is 
summarized in the second proposition. 
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Proposition 2: Suppose that manager B’s effort cannot be observed. Manager A’s optimal 
effort level is still given by condition (6). Manager B’s optimal effort is constant and 
fulfills: 
 1 0 0( )B B Bu X g X
−θ= , (16) 
where 
 
2 2
0
0
2 2
0
1 (1 )
( ) 1( 2 )1 (1 )
B B
B
B B
rR X
r Rg X r r R X
r R
θ
θ
+ σ − ρ
+≡ ≤++ σ − ρ
+
. (17) 
The optimal salary contract with manager B is linear in output from each of the projects: 
 00
0
( ) (1) (1)B BB B B B A
A A
XS g X X X
X
⎛ ⎞ρσ ⎟⎜ ⎟= κ + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ σ⎝ ⎠ , (18) 
where 
 2 2 2 2 21 12 20 0 0 0 0(1 )[ ( )] ( ) [ (1)]B B B B B B BU u X g X X g X E Y
θκ ≡ + + σ − ρ −  
is a constant. The salary of manager A is given by 
 ( )00 0
0
1 ( ) (1) 1 ( ) (1)B BA A B A B B
A A
XRS g X X g X X
r R X
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ρσ ⎟⎜⎢ ⎥⎟= κ + + + −⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎜+ σ⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
, (19) 
with 
 2120 0
1 ln AA A A B
r RW ru X R
r R R
θ⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞λ ⎟⎜⎢ ⎥κ ≡ − + − κ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥+ ⎣ ⎦
 
being another constant. Finally, the investor allocates a fraction 
 
( )
( )
2 1 2 1 21
2 0 0
2 2 2 2
0
2 2 12
0 0
2 2
0
[ 2 ] 2
(1 ) 1
,
[ 2 ]
A B A A B B B AB
A B AB A B AB
r R
RB B B B B
A B AB
u u u X u X r R
W R r
u X u X
W
θ− θ−
θ θ−+
⎛ ⎞− − θ − σ −σ+⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ω = +⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ σ + σ − σ σ + σ − σ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞σ − ρ + θ − θ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜− ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ σ + σ − σ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠
 (20) 
of initial wealth to project A. 
Proof: See the appendix. 
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As expected, manager B’s effort is (weakly) lower than A’s for given investments 
in the respective projects; see equations (16) and (6). The variable g(XB0), defined in (17), 
can be interpreted as a wedge between the first- and second-best efforts, conditional on 
the amount invested in B. We can show that 0'( )Bg X  ≤ 0, where the equality holds if θ 
= 0 or ρ = –1. Except in these two special cases, manager B’s effort level will be lower 
relative to the first-best the more the investor allocates to project B. Whether more 
investment yields higher effort in absolute terms depends on the sign of 
 10 0 0
0
(1 ) ( )B B B B
B
du X g X g X
dX
−θ −θ ′= − θ + . (21) 
As long as 0'( )Bg X  < 0, we now need θ   1 for manager B’s effort to respond positively 
on investment. Compared to the first-best, there is thus smaller range of θ’s for which 
effort increases with investment. 
The sharing rule (18) resembles the relative evaluation scheme discussed by 
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987, p. 324), but here the shares of output accruing to the 
investor and the managers are endogenous to the allocation of initial wealth. Note that 
(18) can be written as 
 ( )0( ) (1) [ (1)]B B BS g X Y E Y= κ + − , 
where [ (1)]B B gE Yκ = κ + . Manager B is given a constant amount plus a share g of the 
surprise in the aggregate performance index Y. The third term in the definition of κB is 
the risk-premium that is optimally paid to manager B. Note that it depends on the 
idiosyncratic risk 2 2(1 )Bσ − ρ  associated with project B. Finally, (18) and (19) show that 
risk sharing between the two managers is generally imperfect when there is moral hazard. 
Turning to portfolio choice, we see that the upper line in (20) bears close 
resemblance to equation (8). The term in the lower line, however, is new and 
conceptually different. It occurs because initial wealth allocation affects the risk-premium 
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and the expected value of the performance index (the last two terms in the definition of 
κB). In turn, this feeds back to the expected value and variability of investors’ net final 
wealth, and therefore their portfolio decisions. To give a more thorough interpretation of 
portfolio choice, it is again helpful to recast the portfolio decision within a mean-variance 
setting. 
 
4.2. The risk-return trade-off with moral hazard 
We can use (18), (19), and the performance index Y to express the investor’s net 
final wealth as (we suppress the argument in g(.) to simplify notation): 
 
( ) ( )2 2 2 2 2 21 12 20 0 0
(1)
(1) [ (1)] (1) (1 ) .
A B
A A B B B B
W S S
r W g E Y Y u X u X rg X tip
r R
θ θ
− −
⎡ ⎤= + − − + − σ − ρ +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦+
 (22) 
Now, as both managers’ efforts are constant also in the second-best, the processes (3) and 
(14) both follow arithmetic Brownian motions. It follows from equation (22) that net 
final wealth is normally distributed over the time interval [0,1]. 
Maximizing (4) is thus again equivalent to maximize 
[ ] [ ]12(1) var (1)A B A BE W S S R W S S− − − − − . 
Taking expectations in (22) and substituting from (6) and (17), we find: 
 
[ ]
( )
2 2 2 2 2 21 1 1
2 2 20 0 0 0
2 2 2 2 21 1 1
2 2 20 0
(1)
( ) (1 )((1 ) ) (1 ) ((1 ) )
( ) (1 ) ((1 ) ) (1 ) ((1 ) ) ,
A B
B
B
E W S S
r W W g g W r g W
r R
r F g g W r g W
r R
−θ −θ
−θ
− −
⎡ ⎤= + ω + − −ω − σ − ρ −ω⎣ ⎦+
⎡ ⎤= ω − − − −ω − σ − ρ −ω⎣ ⎦+
 (23) 
where the function F(ω) was defined and analyzed in Section 3. Comparing (10) and (23), 
we see that the link between the initial allocation and expected net final wealth is quite 
different in the two cases. The last two terms in the lower line of (23) are new relative to 
the first-best. The first of these shows the loss in expected output net of management 
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costs in project B, compared to the first-best. We can show that this loss is strictly 
increasing over ω ∈ [0,1], as long as θ ≤ 2. When θ > 2, the loss is not necessarily 
monotonic over ω ∈ [0,1], but still reaches its minimum of zero at ω = 1. The final term 
in (23) is the risk-premium paid to manager B. It enters with a minus in front, so it 
contributes to lowering the investor’s net expected wealth. The risk-premium also has a 
minimum of zero at ω = 1, and can be shown to be strictly decreasing over ω ∈ [0,1] 
when θ ≤ 1. 
These observations allow us to deduce the following on wealth allocation and 
expected net final wealth in the second-best. Starting with the cases where θ ∉ [1,2], we 
recall from Section 3 that F(ω) then has maxima at 0 and 1. However, as the last two 
terms in the lower line of (23) both have a unique maximum at ω  = 1, expected net final 
wealth is greatest when investing in project A only. The cases with θ = {1,2} are 
analogues; F(ω) is independent of wealth allocation, and hence expected net final wealth 
with moral hazard is maximized by setting ω  = 1. The last possibility is θ ∈ (1,2), where 
we recall that F(ω) has its maximum at ω  = ½. The last term in the upper line of (23) 
gives an incentive to invest more in project A. However, as the risk-premium to manager 
B is possibly non-monotonic in ω for these values of θ, the overall link between initial 
wealth allocation and expected net final wealth is theoretically ambiguous.9 
Turning to the risk of net final wealth, we observe that (22) implies 
[ ] [ ]
2
var (1) var (1) (1)A B
rW S S W gY
r R
⎛ ⎞⎟⎜− − = −⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠+ . 
                                                 
9 Numerical calculations by the author indicate that, for plausible parameters, expected net final wealth is 
maximized for ω > ½ also when θ ∈ (1,2). 
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The optimal contract with manager B leaves the investor exposed to the risk of gross 
final wealth less a (endogenous) share g of the aggregate performance index Y. This risk 
exposition is in turn shared with manager A (the investor carries a share r/(r+R)); hence 
the above expression. Using equation (14), we have 
 [ ] ( )
2
22 2 2
0 0var (1) ' ' (2 ) (1 ) (1 )A B B
rW S S W g g W
r R
⎛ ⎞ ⎡ ⎤⎟⎜− − = ΣΣ − − −ω σ − ρ⎟⎜ ⎢ ⎥⎟⎜ ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠+ w w .  
An implication of this equation is that, unlike with full information, the portfolios that 
minimize gross and net final wealth variance, respectively, are not equal. Interestingly, 
we can show that the net final wealth minimizing share invested in project A is smaller 
than 2 2 2( ) ( 2 )B AB A B ABσ −σ σ + σ − σ  unless θ   2. The most plausible cases of the model 
thus imply that the relevant minimum-variance position is tilted towards project B when 
there is moral hazard. 
The implications for portfolio choice of the above discussion are straightforward. 
Relative to the first-best, expected returns can generally be increased by tilting the 
portfolio towards project A. On the other hand, the minimum-variance position would in 
most cases be tilted towards project B. The combined effect on portfolio choice is 
therefore generally ambiguous. Interestingly, we cannot rule out that the investor should 
optimally increase allocation to the project with moral hazard compared with the case of 
full information. 
We close this section by illustrating the latter point using an example with θ = 0, 
the only case where the portfolio rule can be expressed in closed form. For simplicity, we 
set σA = σB = σ (implying an optimal first-best rule ω = ½; see the discussion in Section 
3.3), and assume that ρ = 0. When θ = 0, the wedge g is a constant given by 
 
2
2( )
r R rRg
r R r r R R
+ + σ=
+ + + σ . 
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Substituting into (20), we can show that the optimal share invested in A is 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
22 2 2 2
22 2 2 2 3 23 3
2 22 2
rR r r R rR r R
rR r r R rR r R r
σ σ − − + σ − +ω = σ σ − − + σ − + − σ .  
It is straightforward to show that this share can be less than half for plausible parameter 
values. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
We have studied the resource allocation of investors that delegate the management of 
their wealth to two different managers. Managers’ effort levels determine the expected 
return from the projects that they govern, but these effort levels are affected by the 
contracts offered by investors. We show that even when managers’ actions are observable 
and enforceable, the investors’ diversification decision involves trade-offs other than a 
standard portfolio problem. This is because, in a principal-agent setting, expected returns 
are endogenous to the allocation of initial wealth. Depending on the shape of managers’ 
cost functions, the expected final wealth net of managerial compensation can exhibit both 
increasing and decreasing returns to invested wealth. In the former case, optimal portfolio 
holdings may be highly undiversified despite the symmetry between projects in the 
underlying model. 
If managers’ actions cannot be observed, additional mechanisms come into play. 
We explore the case with moral hazard in one of the projects. Relative to the first-best, 
expected returns net of managerial costs can generally be increased by tilting the 
portfolio away from the moral hazard project. However, the optimal contract with the 
manager of this project transfers more of the idiosyncratic risk associated with the 
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project to the manager. As a consequence, the minimum-variance position of the 
investors’ net final wealth would in most cases be tilted towards the moral hazard 
project. There are plausible cases of the model where the allocation to the project with 
hidden actions is higher than in the first-best.  
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Appendix 
 
A.1. Proof of Proposition 1 
We start by deriving the optimal sharing rules in terms of the optimal controls uA 
and uB, following Müller (1998). Net compensation to manager i is 
1
21
2 0
0
( )i i i iy S X u t dt
θ= − ∫ . Then, integrating (3) and inserting the result in (4) imply that 
the investor’s problem can be expressed as 
 
({
)}
,
0 0 0{ , }, ,
1
2 21 1
2 20 0 0 0
0
max exp ' ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )(1 ) ( )((1 ) ) ,
A B A B
A Bu u y y
A A B B
E R W W y y
u t W u t W u t W u t W dt
ω
θ θ
⎡− − + Σ − − −⎢⎣
⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎥+ ω − ω + −ω − −ω⎣ ⎦ ⎥⎦∫
1w B B
 
subject to (5). Pointwise maximization with respect to yA and yB gives the first-order 
conditions 
 ( )
1
2 21
20 0 0
0
1 ln (1) ( ) ((1 ) )ii A B j
r R Ry W W u W u W dt y
r R R r R r R
θ θ⎛ ⎞λ ⎡ ⎤⎟⎜= + − − ω + −ω −⎢ ⎥⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠+ + +⎣ ⎦∫ , 
where i,j = A,B, i ≠ j, and λi is the Lagrange-multiplier associated with (5). Solving these 
two equations for yA and yB and using the two participation constraints to demonstrate 
that λA = λB, we find 
( )1 2 2120 0 00
1 ln
2
(1) ( ) ((1 ) )
2
A
A B
A A
ry y
r R R
R W W u W u W dt
r R
θ θ
⎛ ⎞λ ⎟⎜= = ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠+
⎡ ⎤+ − − ω + −ω⎣ ⎦+ ∫
.  (A.1) 
The optimal sharing rules are ( )
1
0
0
( ), , ,i i iS y c u t X dt i A B= + =∫ , where y is given in 
(A.1). 
Next, we substitute the optimal salary functions into (4). The investor’s problem 
can then be simplified to 
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 ( ){ }1 2 212 0 0{ , }, 0max exp (1) ( ) ((1 ) )A B A Bu u E a W b u W u W dtθ θω ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥− − − − ω + −ω⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫  
subject to (3), where a ≡ rR/(r+2R) and b ≡ (r/2R)W0 − (r/2)ln(λAr/R) are constants. 
Let V(t,W(t)) be the investor’s value function, giving the optimal remaining utility at 
time t. By Lemma A1 in Sung (1995), the value function solving the above problem 
satisfies the following dynamic programming equation: 
 
[ ]{ 0 0{ , },
2
2 2 21 1
2 20 0 02
0 max (1 )
' ' ( , ) ( ) ((1 ) ) ,
A B
A Bu u
A B
V V u W u W
t W
V W aV t W u W u W
W
ω
θ θ
∂ ∂≡ + ω + −ω∂ ∂
⎫∂ ⎪⎪⎡ ⎤+ ΣΣ + ω + −ω ⎬⎣ ⎦⎪∂ ⎪⎭
w w
  (A.2) 
with the terminal condition being V(1,W(1)) = −exp[−a(W(1)−b)]. From (A.2), the 
first-order conditions with respect to uA(t), uB(t), and ω are 
 0 0
/( ) , ,
( , ( ))i i i
V Wu h X X i A B
aV t W t
−∂ ∂= =  (A.3) 
2 1 2 11 1
2 20 0
0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2
02 2
/ ( , ) ( ) ((1 ) )
/ 2 / 2
.
2
A B A B
A B AB A B AB
B AB
A B AB
V W u u aV t W u W u WW
V W V W
W
θ− θ−⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤∂ ∂ − θ ω − θ −ω⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ω = − −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ σ + σ − σ ∂ ∂ σ + σ − σ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
σ − σ+ σ + σ − σ
 (A.4) 
Finally, we conjecture that the value function has the form 
 
({
) }
0 0
21
2 0 0 0
( , ( )) exp ( ) (1 ) ( , ) ( ,(1 ) )
' ' ( , ) ( ,(1 ) ) .
A B
A B
V t W t a W t b t f u W f u W
aW c u W c u W
⎡= − − − + − ω + −ω⎣
⎤− ΣΣ − ω − −ω ⎥⎦w w
 (A.5) 
Using (A.5) in (A.3) and (A.4), we obtain equations (6)–(8). Substituting (A.5) into 
(A.2) confirms that (A.5) solves the investor’s dynamic problem. 
 
A.2. Proof of Proposition 2 
We can proceed as under full information to find the optimal sharing rule between 
the investor and manager A in terms of the optimal control uA. The first-order condition 
with respect to SA for the investor’s relaxed problem is thus 
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 ( )
1
21
20 0
0
1 ln (1)AA B A A
r R rS W W S X u dt
r R R r R r R
θ⎛ ⎞λ ⎟⎜= + − − +⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠+ + + ∫ . (A.6) 
Given the optimal sharing rules in (15) and (A.6), the investor’s (stochastic) net terminal 
wealth can be expressed as 
 
( )
1
2 21
20 0 0 0
0
1 1 2
1
20 0
0 0
1(1) (1) ln
' ( ) ' ' .
A
A B A A B B
B B B B
rr RW S S W W U u X u X dt
r R r R r
u X d t r u X dt
θ θ
θ θ
⎡ ⎛ ⎞λ ⎟ ⎡ ⎤⎜⎢− − = − + − − +⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎣ ⎦⎜⎝ ⎠⎢+ ⎣
⎤− Σ − ΣΣ ⎥⎦
∫
∫ ∫m B m m
 
It follows that the investor’s problem can be reduced to 
 
({
( ) )}
1
0{ , }, 0
1 22 21
2 0 0 0
0
max exp (1) ( )
' ' .
A B
B Bu u
A A A B B B
E W u X d t
u X u X r u X dt
θ
ω
θ θ θ
⎡⎢− −α − β− Σ⎢⎣
⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎥− + + ΣΣ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎥⎦
∫
∫
m' B
m m
 (A.7) 
subject to (3), where /( )rR r Rα ≡ +  and 0(1/ ) ln( / ) ( / )Ar r R R r Uβ ≡ λ − +  are 
constants. 
The dynamic programming equation becomes 
 
( ){
( ) }
0 0 0 0{ , },
2
21
2 02
22 21
2 0 0 0
0 max ' '
' '
( , ( )) ( ) ' ' ,
A B
A A B B B Bu u
A A B B B B
V V u X u X u X W
t W
V W
W
V t W t u X u X r u X
θ
ω
θ θ θ
∂ ∂ ⎡ ⎤≡ + + +α ΣΣ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∂ ∂
∂+ ΣΣ∂
⎡ ⎤+ α + + +α ΣΣ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
w m
w w
m m
 (A.8) 
with the terminal condition being ( ) ( )1, (1) exp (1)V W W⎡ ⎤= − −α − β⎣ ⎦ . The first-order 
conditions with respect to uA, uB, and ω, respectively, read: 
 0 0
/ ,
( )A A A
V Wu X X
V
θ −∂ ∂= α i  (A.9) 
 0 0 00
0
/ ' '
( ) 1 ( ) ' '
B B
B B
B
V W X X Wu X
V r X
θ
θ
θ
⎡ ⎤−∂ ∂ +α ΣΣ⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥α + +α ΣΣ⎣ ⎦
w m
m mi , (A.10) 
   ( )
2 2
0
0 2 2 2 2
2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 21
2 0 0 0
02 2 2 2 2 2
/ (1 ) (1 )
/ 2
( ) (1 )( , ) .
/ 2 2
A B B B B
A B AB
A A B B B B B B AB
A B AB A B AB
V W u u u XW
V W
u X u X r u XV t W W
V W
θ
θ− θ− θ−
⎡ ⎤∂ ∂ − −α + θ σ − ρ⎢ ⎥ω = − ⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ σ + σ − σ⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤θ − − θ +α σ − ρα σ −σ⎢ ⎥− +⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ σ + σ − σ σ + σ − σ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 (A.11) 
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We use  
 
({
( ) ) }
0 0 0 0
22 2 21 1
2 20 0 0 0
( , ) exp ( ) (1 ) ' '
' ' ( ) ' ' ,
t A A B B B B
A A A B B B
V t W W t t u X u X u X W
W u X u X r u X
θ
θ θ θ
⎡ ⎡ ⎤= − −α −β + − + +α ΣΣ⎢ ⎣ ⎦⎣
⎤⎡ ⎤− α ΣΣ − + + +α ΣΣ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎦
w m
w w m m
 
as a trial solution for the value function. Taking the appropriate derivatives and 
substituting into (A.9)–(A.11) gives (16) and (20). Equations (18) and (19) are obtained 
by combining (16) and (6) with (15) and (A.6), respectively. Substituting the trial 
solution into (A.8) confirms that it solves the dynamic programming equation. 
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